How Serious is Sugarman's "Serious
Tort Law Reform"?

MONROE BERKOWITZ*

A reply to Professor Sugarman.
THE PROPOSAL

In outline, Professor Sugarman's proposals for serious tort reform
are quite simple. He would abolish tort recoveries for short-term
losses, that is, those which are incurred in the first six months. Tort
remedies would be retained to cover longer-term losses, permanent
injuries, pain and suffering and possibly punitive damages, but with
changes designed to lower costs and increase equity. Tort recoveries
would no longer duplicate benefits available from other sources; also,
awards for pain and suffering and punitive damages would be constrained. However, successful tort plaintiffs would become entitled to
compensation from defendants for their reasonable attorney's fees
and would not have their awards reduced if they were at fault.
Short-Term Losses
Consider first the short term losses. Under Professor Sugarman's
plan, all these income losses, regardless of cause, would be removed
from the tort system (only persons suffering a serious disfigurement
or impairment would have access to the tort system for the payment
of general damages). Such losses would be covered by employer-provided sick leave for the first six days of income loss, some version of
state-mandated temporary disability insurance to cover income loss
after the expiration of sick leave, and continued coverage of income
* Professor of Economics, Rutgers University. B.A. 1942, Ohio University; Ph.D.
1951, Columbia University.

loss after the expiration of sick leave for the next 25 weeks. Medical
costs would be covered by employer-provided health coverage and
nonearners would look to Medicaid and Medicare.
These provisions would cover income loss for those employed.
Since those not employed have no income loss, Professor Sugarman
reasons that they should receive no compensation. This approach ignores entirely the person who is injured just before he or she embarks on a job. The high school graduate injured in an automobile
crash the night of the prom would receive no income replacement
since he had no income to replace, even though, had he not been
injured, he would have begun his work career on Monday morning.
It ignores those persons who are unemployed but still in the labor
market, for example, workers who are between jobs. The prior employer might be obligated to cover the employee for a finite period of
time, but should the employer be obligated to cover the laid-off or
discharged employee until he finds a new job? Such a provision
would hardly appear to be equitable, and yet literally thousands of
employees are between jobs at any given moment of time.
Small employers, defined as those with fewer than five employees,'
would be exempt from being required to provide sick leave for the
first week. These sweeping reforms pose problems for the significant
number of persons who work in these small firms, as well as for the
self-employed who presumably would not be required to insure themselves for sick leave pay.
Is it nitpicking to point out these instances where the proposed
scheme is missing coverage, or fails to take into account a particular
contingency? Are these matters which can be repaired by fine-tuning
once the system is in place? I think not. These are the kinds of cases
that test the system, and nowhere in Professor Sugarman's lengthy
article does the author address the problems posed by these lacunae.
Reforming the Tort System and the Welfare System: Global
Remedies are Easy, Only the Details are Difficult
The whole matter of tort reform can be compared to the question
of welfare reform. Professor Sugarman has drawn a lengthy bill of
indictment against the current system, and although his indictment
is not data driven, it rests on some widely shared opinions about how
the system works (or does not work), or at least some consensus as to
its evils. In similar fashion, it is relatively easy to set forth what is
wrong with the current system of providing welfare payments, particularly under the Aid to Families of Dependent Children (AFDC)
program.' While most observers would agree with the list of short1. Sugarman, Serious Tort Law Reform, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 795 (1987).
2. See, for example, the cases cited in PRESIDENT'S COM'N FOR A NAT'L
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comings, it is difficult to get a majority to agree on what should re-

place this welfare program. The proposal to have some form of Negative Income Tax (NIT) 3 appeals both to conservatives and liberals.

The difficulties appear only as one begins to specify a tax rate breakeven point (the point at which no monies would be paid), as well as

the maximum amount to be paid any one family. The problems increase as one gets down to specific cases and worries about divorced

families, alcoholic parents and other realities of the modern world.
And the problems really become intractable as one makes decisions
about the existing programs which should be displaced by the new
NIT. In principle, the NIT is appealing but the practical difficulties
of implementation loom large and must be solved before one can
hope to formulate the political consensus necessary to change the
system.
When originally proposed by Milton Friedman, the idea was that
the NIT would have the virtue of eliminating the transfer payment
programs which were thought to have all sorts of perverse incentives. 4 Literally, that meant doing away with all transfer type pro-

grams from unemployment insurance to social security old age pensions.5 When McGovern ran for President, the NIT was to be an
integral plank in his platform.' When the reality hit that implementing the NIT meant scuttling unemployment insurance and social se-

curity, the politic answer was that both the NIT and the older programs should survive. Such a decision knocks out the cost-saving

argument for wanting the NIT in the first place. Professor
Sugarman makes no such mistake. He has the courage of his convicAGENDA IN THE EIGHTIES, REPORT OF THE PANEL ON GOVERNMENT AND THE ADVANCEMENT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE, HEALTH, WELFARE, EDUCATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1980).

The Panel cites the case of a widowed mother of several children, one of whom is disabled. "In a typical jurisdiction, she will have to go to at least 4 different offices, fill out
at least 5 different forms and answer some 300 separate questions. . . .Fourteen hundred pieces of information may be needed just to determine accurately the level of the
woman's income." Id. at 73. Yet, although there is no lack of shortcomings to the present
system that the Panel can cite, it is less than confident when it comes to setting forth any
grand solution.
3. The proposal is set forth in summary form in M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM 190-95 (1962).
4. Friedman goes on to make some simple calculations to show that the negative
income tax at the rates he proposes would be less expensive than the social welfare expenditures that he would scrap. Id.
5. Id. Even Friedman did not go all the way and propose eliminating all transfer
programs. In making his calculations, he eliminated the veterans' programs for reasons
which are not difficult to rationalize. The problem in the real world is that each person
has a different reason for exempting one program or the other.
6. N.Y. Times, July 8, 1972, at 10, col. 1; Aug. 30, 1972, at 1, col. 8.

tions. It is not a matter of taking collateral sources into account
when tort recoveries are calculated. Professor Sugarman would abolish some of the collateral source programs, or at least parts of them.
Incremental reforms are possible and take place every day in the
welfare system and in the tort system. During the 1970s, every state
except West Virginia enacted some change in the area of medical
malpractice lawsuits. 7 In welfare, the Supplementary Security Income (SSI) program 8 approximates a modified negative income tax,
although no one dares to call it such. Massachusetts and New Jersey
are also experimenting with some sort of work program,9 which also
borrows from the NIT concept, though in a partial and disguised
form. The advantage of the slow, partial approach is that problems
can be solved as they appear. I do admit that the debate on the NIT,
which did not culminate in any dramatic national legislation, inspired the desire to do something and even shaped the type of
changes which have come about. In that sense, Professor Sugarman's
article is thoughtful and, if meant to stir the debate pot, fine. However, if his article is meant to be a blueprint for the future, there are
problems.
Scuttling Workers' Compensation
Professor Sugarman's income replacement scheme covers accidental injuries of all types regardless of fault: work, home, road accidents, medical malpractice. Given that income replacement would be
forthcoming from the temporary disability insurance, he would simply do away with any medical or other short-term income replacement from workers' compensation.
This seemingly simple change seems motivated by a commonlyheld assumption that the workers' compensation system is inefficient
and a bit anachronistic. However, Professor Sugarman does not propose to abolish workers' compensation any more than he seeks to do
away entirely with the tort system. He proposes to take short-term
losses out of the tort system. He would do away with what the workers' compensation system calls temporary total disabilities, but only
for the first twenty-six weeks. Persons injured on the job would remain eligible for workers' compensation benefits if they remained
disabled or impaired after twenty-six weeks.
7. An illuminating table showing the status of tort reform provisions in each state
is contained in INS. INFORMATION INSTITUTE, 1986-87 PROPERTY CASUALTY FACT BOOK
60 (1987). The table shows for each state the varied reform provisions including such
items as regulation of attorney fees, provisions codifying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
in medical liability cases by delineating the circumstances in which it may be applied,
limiting the amount of liability, changing the collateral source rules, and so on.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1381-83 (1982).
9. R. SMITH, WORK-RELATED PROGRAMS FOR WELFARE RECIPIENTS 24-29 (Congressional Budget Office 1987).
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Is Workers' Compensation Left With An Impossible Job?

Only about 10 percent of all temporary total disability cases in
workers' compensation last for more than twenty-six weeks."0
Outside of the medical only cases, temporary total disability cases
are the most frequent cases encountered in the workers' compensa-

tion system, but by no means are they the most expensive. That distinction falls to the permanent partial disability cases."' Approxi-

mately 10 to 12 percent of the compensation benefit dollar goes to
pay temporary total disability benefits, whereas from one-third to

one-half of the benefits are used to pay permanent partial disability
cases. 1 2 The other big category of benefits is medical care costs. In

California, for example, 1.6 percent of the benefits dollar went to
pay for fatalities, 1.5 percent for permanent total cases, 48.8 percent

for permanent partial injuries, 5.3 percent for temporary total and
the balance, 42.8 percent, for medical. 3 Presumably, under Professor Sugarman's proposed reforms, workers' compensation would still
be left with all permanent partial injuries, fatalities and permanent
total cases, and some unknown proportion of the medical costs.
10. Fratello, Workmen's Compensation Injury Table and Standard Wage Distribution Table, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SOCIETY XLII 140, exhibit E-6 (undated). In Fratello's distribution of 1,578,846 days of disability, only
149,669 days of disability last more than 182 days or 26 weeks.
11. The distribution of incurred benefits by injury type for almost all states is reported by the National Council on Compensation Insurance. See NAT'L COUNCIL ON
COMPENSATION INS., 1987 ANNUAL STATISTICAL BULLETIN 324-25, exhibit X1 (1987).
12. Permanent partial disability cases are, by far, the most expensive of the benefit
categories. Various states choose to compensate this type of disability in one of three
ways - by actual wage loss, by measuring the degree of impairment, or by estimating
the loss in what is called "wage-earning capacity." The laws of most states contain a
schedule, a price list, as it were, of the parts of the body. The loss of an arm, finger, or
toe is listed, typically, as so many weeks of compensation. California is an exception in
that it has no schedule in its statute but uses an extensive and comprehensive schedule to
rate all permanent partial disabilities.
Professor Sugarman states that these schedules provide for payments, "for what
amounts to pain and suffering." Sugarman, supra note 1, at 828. I seriously doubt that
the analogy is an apt one. Although none of the original workers' compensation laws
contained schedules, they were soon put into them within two or three years after original enactment. The case can be made that these schedules were an administrative attempt to introduce certainty and to estimate in some general way what the wage loss

would have been for the average worker. The California schedule, probably borrowed
from the Russian schedules of the early 1900s, makes this explicit in that the ratings are
adjusted for the worker's occupation and age. See generally, M. BERKOWITZ & J. BURTON. PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION (1987).
13. These data are from NAT'L COUNCIL ON COMPENSATION INS., 1987 ANNUAL
STATISTICAL BULLETIN 324-25, exhibit XI (1987). Each jurisdiction in workers' compensation is different and these distributions will differ, but the California experience is not
radically different from the others.

Could a system of workers' compensation adapt to these new rules
under which its responsibility would not kick in until the worker has
been off work for some twenty-six weeks? I doubt that such a system
would be viable. A hallmark of workers' compensation is the abso14
lute necessity of distinguishing between work and nonwork injuries.
When a worker suffers an accident at work, the employer is obligated to file a form, usually called the "First Report of Accident."",
Would such a form still be required under the proposed reforms? It
is difficult enough to get employers to file such forms promptly under
the current system. The employer would take this form less seriously
if no action was to be taken determining the liability, the amount of
medical care costs, and temporary total benefits unless and until the
employee was out of work for at least twenty-six weeks. At the end
of twenty-six weeks it would be difficult to make a judgment about
whether the accidental injury did or did not "arise out of or in the
course of employment." The proposed reforms would be placing an
impossible administrative burden on workers' compensation, even as
they sought to relieve the program of responsibility for the payment
of one type of benefits.
The Workers' Compensation Program -

Is It Worth Saving?

The survival of workers' compensation as a separate viable program is not at the top of the agenda of most academic scholars interested in accident issues. Yet, I would urge those who would throw
this particular baby out with the bath water to at least pause and
recognize the nature and the dimensions of workers' compensation,
and something of its rather amazing ability to withstand past attempts to dislodge it from its position as the premier program in the
area of work injuries.
The program exists in each state of the Union and in the District
of Columbia, with separate jurisdictions covering federal employees
and longshore and harbor workers. For the most part, employers are
compelled by law to assure their financial responsibility for making
the mandated payments. In most states they may self-insure if they
14. This distinction is, at once, the system's prime strength and its prime weakness.
The strength of the distinction is what gives the system its justification for being. It
provides the rationalization for instant coverage of the worker on the job before that
person has demonstrated his or her attachment to the labor force, as in unemployment
insurance; it is also the rationale for placing the responsibility for the accident on the
employer, regardless of fault.
The obvious weakness is the sheer difficulty of having to draw the line between work
and nonwork injuries, especially in cases of occupational illnesses and cumulative trauma
cases where it is difficult to fix the time of the "accident."
15. In some jurisdictions, this report becomes either the basis for accident and
safety statistics in the state, the first document of what will be a compensation file, or
both.
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can provide evidence of their financial responsibility. In fourteen
states, they may choose to insure in a state fund, while in another

seven states they are compelled to insure in the exclusive state fund
in the jurisdiction. In most states the employer insures liability with
a private insurance carrier who administers the program.16
The workers' compensation program is huge in terms of benefit

programs. Private carriers wrote over $17 billion in premiums and
paid out more than that amount in losses and expenses in 1985.17 In
1984, the last year for which comprehensive data are available, ben-

efits paid amounted to $19.5 billion. Of that amount, $10.6 billion
were paid out by carriers, $5.3 billion by state funds and $3.6 billion

by employers who self-insured.
Most of the benefit dollars, some $13.2 billion, went for cash bene-

fits while the balance, $6.3 billion, went for medical and hospital
payments. The costs of workers' compensation amounted to 1.66 per-

cent of employer payroll, down from the high point of 1.86 percent
in 1980.18

Perhaps the costs of the program are not of prime importance, but
the amounts involved show that this program is not trivial. Indeed, it

is an established, some would say entrenched, program that will not
be easy to dislodge. If it is legitimate to criticize Professor

Sugarman's proposal on the grounds that it is politically infeasible,
then removing temporary disability benefits from workers' compensation poses one formidable obstacle.

16. The provisions of the state laws can be found in U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMIN., OFFICE OF STATE LIAISON AND LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS,
Div.

OF STATE WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, STATE WORKERS' COMPENSATION

(Jan. 1987). This publication is issued approximately every six months. Another
source of current information on the provisions of the laws in the several states is CHAMLAWS

BER OF COMMERCE, WASHINGTON,

D.C.,

ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS,

which is revised annually.
17. INs. INFORMATION INST., 1986-87 PROPERTY/CASUALTY FACT BOOK 30
(1987). There are many different ways in which to portray the size of the program. The
most comprehensive look at overall costs is to be found in the periodic articles in the
SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN.

See, e.g., Price, Workers' Compensation: Coverage, Bene-

fits, and Costs, 1982, 47 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 7-13 (1984). See also Price, Social Security Programsin the United States, 1987, Workers' Compensation, 50 SOC. SECURITY
BULL. 31-39 (1987) [hereinafter Price, Social Security Programs]. The latter article includes information about workers' compensation programs in each of the states, the three
federal programs and the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, commonly known
as the "Black Lung" program.
18. These totals include payments under the Black Lung program. In 1982, payments under this program amounted to $16.1 billion according to Price, Social Security
Programs,supra note 17, at 8.

The Survival of Workers' Compensation
Workers' compensation has survived for more than three-quarters
of a century. Here is a Progressive Era program which certainly
never lived up to its promise of providing a swift, certain remedy in
place of the uncertain vagaries of the tort system. 19 In spite of these
failed promises, the program has led a charmed life and each time it
looked as if the program might be abandoned, it emerged as strong
as ever. The history of workers' compensation is at least, in passing,
strange when it is considered that the program began in an era when
the power of government to intervene and mandate conditions at the
work place was most limited. "The notion that the government could
go beyond mediation or do more than establish minimum standards,
that it could itself supply social welfare services took many years to
arise."' 20 The workers' compensation program successfully weathered
the challenge posed by the newer social security legislation. With the
advent of federal disability insurance under social security, workers'
compensation no longer had the field to itself, and although it ceded
some of its responsibilities, it emerged with clear title to the area of
industrial injuries.
Perhaps most important, the state programs have responded to
challenges by exhibiting a surprising dynamism. After the recommendations of the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws in 1972, an unprecedented wave of reforms emerged
whereby coverage and benefits increased dramatically.2 Since that
initial wave of reforms, a second wave has dealt with administrative
changes and provisions for compulsory rehabilitation. The program
has exhibited a surprising resiliency and, in spite of the formidable
challenges of product liability suits and occupational disease litigation, it shows no signs of fading away.
One must conclude that the program, in its imperfect way, serves
a purpose, as well as satisfies the voting constituencies of the several
states. The problems the workers' compensation program deals with
the fixing of amounts to be paid in permanent partial disability
19. For a fuller explanation of the surprising stability of the workers' compensation
system, see Berkowitz & Berkowitz, Challenges to Workers' Compensation:An Histori-

cal Analysis,

in WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS, ADEQUACY, EQUITY

&

EFFI-

158 (J.Worrall & D. Appel ed. 1985); and Berkowitz & Berkowitz, The Survival of Workers' Compensation, 58 Soc. SERVICE REV. 259 (1984).
20. See Berkowitz & Berkowitz, Challenges to Workers' Compensation: An Historical Analysis, supra note 19, at 164.
21. These changes in the law were tracked by the United States Department of
CIENCY

Labor and published periodically. See, e.g., U.S.

DEP'T OF L.1OR, EMPLOYMENT STAN-

DARDS ADMIN., OFFICE OF STATE LIAISON AND LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS, DIV. OF STATE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, STATE WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS IN EFFECT ON OCTOBER, 1982 COMPARED WITH THE 19 ESSENTIAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS (1982).
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cases - are inherently difficult. There is no one absolutely correct
way of administering these benefits and the various states have chosen quite different ways to solve these problems. Despite the program's lack of uniformity across states, its survival would argue that
it meets the needs of those most affected by it.
I recognize the logic of Professor Sugarman's position and the inherently satisfying use of the existing Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) and employer-provided benefit schemes to cover shortterm losses without involving the expensive and cumbersome tort system. But there are difficulties on the edges and at the corners, as it
were, where particular persons are not covered. If Professor
Sugarman's logic means emasculating the current workers' compensation system, it is doubtful if his scheme is doable, and equally
doubtful if it is desirable.
THE INDICTMENT

At the outset, let me say that I have no reason to believe that
Professor Sugarman's indictment of the tort system is misleading or
mistaken. The questions I raise are different. I ask, how does he
know? Where is his evidence? I would also raise the issue of whether
things are getting better or worse. What are the trends in the field?
Have matters now reached such a state that we are justified in asking society to overturn established programs, to compel all employers
to provide insurance coverage they have not voluntarily chosen to
offer, and possibly to create a whole new set of inequities to substitute for the old?
Professor Sugarman argues that the current tort system ought to
be judged on a utilitarian basis, "by comparing [its] costs with [its]
benefits." 22 This is a test with which I, an economist, feel most comfortable. What I would expect, then, is for the author to begin to
tackle the tough issues of calculating the costs and the benefits, reducing these to some common metric so that they can be compared.
Except for some comment in his footnotes, Professor Sugarman does
not provide sufficient explanation and detail, particularly in a situation such as this one, in which the benefit-cost calculus is so crucial
to the control of the article. Instead, he presents a series of value
judgments relating to the wasteful and unnecessary tests that physicians are compelled to perform, and the excessive defensive litigation
strategies to defeat claims that are well justified under current rules.
22. Sugarman, supra note 1 at 795.

These are normative judgments resting on no evidence whatsoever.
But even if these judgments are obvious and well recognized facts, if
they are to be placed into a cost-benefit calculus, it is necessary to go
further and try to estimate their effects, especially since we are told
that the system is intolerably expensive and that we are not getting
our money's worth.
Putting costs and benefits aside, the indictment runs along the
lines that the tort system is a lottery in which the participants are
hardly voluntary players, that too small a portion of the insurance
premium dollar finds its way into the pockets of the victims, that too
much of the funds received duplicate benefits received from other
sources, that some persons are ignorant about the source of the damage to them, while others have no plausible defendant to sue.
The latter point is interesting in its implication that someone
should be responsible for all injuries. Single car accidents, falls from
one's roof while cleaning the gutters, home and recreational accidents are cited as examples where the injuries are essentially selfinflicted, "[y]et, these victims, like other victims, need compensation. ' '23 It is not only that they need compensation, but the amounts
to be received evidently should be the same as if someone were at
fault or if the accident arose out of and in the course of employment.
Professor Sugarman, in his understandable zeal to provide basic protection for income loss and medical costs for those who suffer any
and all sicknesses and accidents, regardless of cause (everyone
should have the basic protection afforded a University of California
law professor), is forced to discount heavily any safety or deterrence
objectives which the tort law may have.
He discards proposals which cut back victims' rights on the
grounds that they do nothing for uncompensated persons and also on
the grounds of practicality. "Combining the political power of the
plaintiff's bar and . . . arguments about the one-sidedness of the
proposed changes means that perhaps only a few states will make
substantial reforms. 2 4 It seems to me that Professor Sugarman realistically appraises the political difficulties in making fundamental reforms, but ignores the same practical difficulties in the reforms he
eventually proposes, especially as they involve changing the workers'
compensation program, extending the TDI program and mandating
employer sick leave and health insurance. 2 These are hardly trivial
23. Id. at 800.
24. Id. at 802-03.
25. 1 do not.discuss the complicated issue of requiring all employers to provide
health insurance for employees simply because it is such a complicated issue. Certainly,
it is not the kind of issue which can be treated as simply as Professor Sugarman does. At
the moment, the issue is receiving increased attention because of its implications for cost
shifting. The insurance industry does not quite know how to react to legislative proposals
to mandate such coverage. They would be delighted to have the business but recognize
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changes.
PoliticalAdjustment Mechanisms and Allocation Decisions
Quite apart from these practical difficulties, Professor Sugarman
minimizes the incremental reforms which have been made in the tort
system by the legislatures responding to problems as they arise. If
physicians cannot buy malpractice insurance at prices they believe to
be within reason, something happens. Impossible situations do have a
way of resolving themselves. Legislatures have been active in the
area of making changes in the tort system and, it is hoped, some of
them may even do some good and help improve matters.26 If certain
activities no longer can take place because of prohibitive insurance
rates, that may not be altogether bad. One of the fundamental purposes of allocating costs to activities which produce these extra costs
is to alert society to the true amount of resources used in producing
the activity so that rational decisions can be made about the
amounts to be produced.
It is this internalizing of externalities which the tort system is
called upon to perform. Professor Sugarman downplays, even denigrates, the role of the system in the area of safety and deterrence.
Postponing that discussion for the moment, the related but separate
issue would remain important if tort recoveries had no deterrent
value. If a byproduct of the logging industry is a certain number of
accidents, then the cost of these accidents should enter into the price
of lumber. Rational allocation decisions should incorporate this information in and deciding whether to build with wood or steel. Pooling such costs over all employers blunts the pricing mechanism so as
to make it almost useless for allocation purposes.
Safety and Deterrence
In order to sustain his proposals for reform, Sugarman must take
the position that the present tort system is almost useless when it
comes to encouraging safe behavior and deterring activities which
cause harm. I would not take such a position. I wish that I could
that once coverage becomes mandated, issues of control and regulation cannot be far
behind. For some of the complexities surrounding the general issue, see Wilensky, Variable Strategiesfor Dealing With the Uninsured, HEALTH AFFAIRS 33-46 (Spring 1987).

26.

As Worrall notes in another context, "The political market is the mechanism

through which groups attempt to shift the cost burden of disability." Worrall, Nominal
Costs, Nominal Prices, and Nominal Profits, in IssuEs IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION (J.
Chelius ed. 1986).

present incontrovertible evidence of the deterrent power of retaining
workers' compensation and the tort system, but I cannot. But my
review of the evidence on these matters convinces me that the system
does some good and it is my value judgment that the benefits outweigh the costs.
These are old issues and arguments. In reforming their accident
compensation systems, both New Zealand and Great Britain decided
against a system which would retain the sophisticated insurance
pricing system whereby premiums are adjusted to employer experience with accidents. In New Zealand, there is at least some evidence
that the introduction of the new scheme resulted in a substantial increase in reported accidents.17 In England, the Pearson Commission,
considering the matter of adjusting levies to the accident experience
of employers, noted that a majority of the members were attracted
to the idea as a theory, but thought it would have only a limited
effect on accident prevention. It concluded, with one dissent, that the
industrial injury scheme be financed through the existing system of
National Insurance contributions and supplements from general
revenues.
The lone dissent was from Professor Prest and he expressed his
feelings in terms of apt analogy:
As a general principle, it must make sense to relate the charges necessary to
finance injury compensation to the risk potential of different activities. No
one would dream of arguing that the price per pound of very decayed cod
should be the same as that of very fresh salmon; or at least no one who
argued for 2such
an arrangement would volunteer to clear up the
8
consequences.

Prest pointed out that the consequences of not relating charges to
the probabilities of generating industrial accidents amounted to
cross-subsidization between safer and riskier industries, resulting in
the lack of incentives to install safety devices and the like. He notes
that Beveridge in his famous
report on social insurance endorsed the
29
same general principle.
England has always differed from the United States in allowing
tort recoveries for work injuries where negligence can be shown, even
as it administered a separate social insurance system for work injuries. Interestingly enough, the Pearson Commission recommended
retention of the tort system. They noted the controversy surrounding
27. See M. BERKOWITZ, THE ECONOMICS OF WORK ACCIDENTS IN NEW ZEALAND
(1979). Since the publication of this study, New Zealand has moved to a type of differ-

ential levy on employers by awarding merit rebates on the premiums paid.
28. I REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CIVIL LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY %200 (1975) (Lord Pearson, Chairman) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION].

29. Id; see SIR
89 (1942).
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the issue of the effects of tort recoveries on accident prevention and
safety. 30 The Pearson Commission noted that there was an opposite
point of view:
Some of our witnesses felt strongly that retention of the tort system, far
from being a hindrance to safety at work, was necessary to maintain standards of accident prevention. They pointed to stringent surveys by insurance
companies, and the effect on employers of the risk that unsafe practices
would be exposed in court.3 1
MIXING AND MATCHING THE SYSTEMS

The number of combinations and permutations is interesting. It is
possible to have only the tort system, as we did in the field of work
injuries prior to 1911, and as we still do in other areas; to have only
workers' compensation, as we do for work injuries; to have both, as
England did for a period, and possibly still does if the current system
for compensating work injuries can be considered a workers' compensation system. It is also possible to have neither, or a little of
both, as Professor Sugarman proposes. I am arguing that his proposal blunts the safety incentives in both systems, although I recognize
that he can argue that he is retaining the best of both worlds.
There is some evidence that there are differences in the safety incentives in the tort system and in workers' compensation. Professor
Sugarman essentially agrees with the early twentieth century critics
of the tort system as it applied in the industrial environment."2 They
saw it as a system where a low percentage of workers were able to
collect damages, but those who did collect typically received larger
awards than the benefits available with relative certainty under
workers' compensation. The switch from court judgments to workers'
compensation was essentially a switch from a low probability-high
compensation system to a high probability-low compensation system.
Ashford and Johnson compared the expected values (probability
times amount of compensation) of both systems."3 This "expected
value" is a measure of the injury costs assigned to the employer (one
minus the expected value is the cost assignment to the employee).
30. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION, supra note 28, %200; see LORD ROBENS,
SAFETY AND HEALTH AT WORK (1972). The Robens committee had also expressed con-

cern over the effects of such litigation on safety.
31. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION, supra note 28, 193.
32. See Sugarman, supra note 1.
33. Ashford & Johnson, Negligence vs. No-Fault Liability: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis of the Workers' Compensation Example, 12 SETON HALL L. J. 725
(1982).

Ashford and Johnson's calculations indicate that it is very likely that
the expected value of injury costs assigned to the employer was
higher under the negligence system than under workers' compensation. This finding, when integrated with the finding that the introduction of a workers' compensation system was associated with a
higher level of safety, indicated that the employer's relative certainty
of being assigned injury costs was more critical than the magnitude
of the expected value of these costs. In other words, imposing the
injury costs on employers in a reasonably certain manner appears to
34
have been a key factor in raising the level of occupational safety.
Admittedly, there are many different possible approaches to providing incentives to producing the optimal amount of health and
safety in addition to the negligence system or workers' compensation.
The market system, with its compensating differentials, creates some
incentives. In a perfectly competitive market, workers will be paid a
compensating wage differential equal to the expected value of the
risk borne by the marginal worker. Economists grow weary attempting to find the existence and size of such differentials and their relation to programs such as workers' compensation.3
Smith has proposed an injury tax under which, in effect, employers would be penalized financially according to the number and type
of injury. It is also possible to rely on some inspection/penalty approach such as is embodied in the Occupational Safety and Health
Act, or simply to depend on the collective bargaining approach in
unionized firms. These are all arrows in the same quiver. I would
argue that any and all of them are necessary. They play an important role in inducing safety and health by the workers' compensation
system which is in place and functioning, and by the tort system
where that is allowed its sway. To make changes in these systems,
which would interfere with their prevention and their allocation
functions, seems to me to be moving in the wrong direction. Somewhat the same arguments might be made about rehabilitation, but I
confine my arguments only to the prevention and allocation aspects
of the problem.
34. A fuller discussion of these matters is to be found in J. BURTON & M.
BERKOWITZ, THE ROLE OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAM IN PROMOTING
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (1982).

35. There is extensive literature in this area which finds these differentials more
readily where there is an elevated risk of death rather than injury. See, e.g., Smith,
Compensating Wage Differentials and Public Policy: A Review, 32 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 339 (1979). See also Dorsey, Employment Hazards and Fringe Benefits: Further
Tests for Compensating Differentials, in SAFETY AND THE WORK FORCE 87 (J. Worrall
ed. 1983). An excellent brief summary of the literature is found in Worrall's introductory
chapter in the same volume.
36. R. SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT 73-85 (1976).
37. A good evaluation of some of the collective bargaining approaches can be
found in T. KOCHAN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1980).
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CONCLUSION

To accept the present tort system as it is may be as foolish as
wanting to pull it up by its roots. I would not for one moment deny
some of the particulars of the bill of indictment that Professor
Sugarman draws, but I am a bit wary of his reliance on anecdotal
evidence. The drive toward workers' compensation in the early part
of the century was fueled by horror stories of the increase in the
number of industrial accidents and the poor chances workers had to
recover at law. Yet more recent evidence indicates that the workers'
chances were improving and judgments were becoming more generous. At the beginning of the twentieth century, in contrast to an earlier period, juries were showing a marked sympathy towards injured
employees and were increasingly willing to find employers responsible.38 In similar fashion, there are changes afoot in the tort area in
each of the states. It might be wise to let the current wave of tort
reform play itself out before more radical changes are instituted.
Professor Sugarman poses the correct test for changes. He talks of
the costs and the benefits; and he argues that the benefits of his proposals far outweigh the costs, although it is not always clear whether
he has in mind the costs he associates with the current system, or the
costs involved in making the change to the new system. Although I
criticize his lack of quantitative evidence as to the costs and benefits,
I understand the difficulties. The problem is difficult to conceptualize
and model, and the data are most sparse.
I believe that the problems of tort reform and the problems of
welfare reform have a good deal in common. In each area, wonderful
plans can be drawn, but implementation becomes difficult if not impossible. The seemingly unimportant details, be they small employers, changing family structures, or programs already in place, prevent their execution. But even if these matters could be solved - if
all details were ironed out and political paths were smoothed - we
are left with the prevention, deterrence and allocation issues.
I would agree that if workers' compensation and tort recoveries
have no deterrence or allocation functions to perform, they might as
well be discarded. They could be absorbed in one program or the
other with some expansion of first party coverage. But I believe that
would be moving in the wrong direction. More, not fewer, built-in
incentives are needed to move toward safe and healthful conduct on
the part of those who provide jobs and services. Professor
38.

Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 19 J.

LEGAL STUD.

44-52 (1972).

Sugarman's article is an incisive examination of the problem which
forces us to examine each of the issues, but, in the end, it points us
in the wrong direction.

